Trade liberalisation and innovation under sector heterogeneity. by Navas, A.
Trade liberalisation and innovation under sector heterogeneity.
Antonio Navas y
The University of She¢ eld.
September 2014
Abstract
Mark-ups and the degree of trade openness vary substantially across sectors. This paper builds a
multi-sector endogenous growth model to study the inuence of trade liberalisation on innovation and,
by extension, on sector and aggregate productivity growth under sectoral heterogeneity. I nd that
di¤erences in the degree of competition generate substantial di¤erences in rms innovative responses
to trade liberalisation. A movement from autarky to free trade promotes innovation and productivity
growth in those sectors which are initially less competitive. This result is robust to an alternative scenario
in which the economy is open to trade, but the degree of trade openness is common across sectors. Finally
the paper outlines the importance of reallocation e¤ects within sectors and across sectors that are the
result of di¤erences in product market competition across sectors. A movement towards zero trade costs
has a smaller e¤ect on aggregate innovation when the sectors are heterogeneous in terms of competition.
Keywords: Sectoral productivity, international trade, innovation.
JEL CODES: F12, O43.
1 Introduction
A recent body of theoretical and empirical literature studies the inuence of trade openness and trade
liberalisation on productivity growth. These studies explore the extent to which a larger degree of trade
openness a¤ects the rate of a sectors technological change and ultimately the evolution of TFP. To address
this question, some researchers have relied on endogenous growth models with imperfect competition and
product or process innovation (Segerstrom et al.,(1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a)), Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991b), Peretto (2003), Licandro and Navas (2011)), and more recently, rm heterogeneity and
industry dynamics (Ederington and Mc Calman (2007), Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), Gustafson and
Segerstrom (2010), Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Navas and Sala (2007), Long et al. (2011), Impulliti and
Licandro (2011)).
These papers focus on the representative sector case, hence di¤erences among sectors and the interactions
that could emerge because of these di¤erences are not explored. Empirical evidence suggests that sectors
are not homogenous in two dimensions that are relevant to a rms investment decision to innovate: the
degree of product market competition and the degree of trade openness.1 The former is a key determinant
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context. However, this could be the result of low trade barriers or other technological advantages. Following this critique we
use sectoral trade costs measures provided by Bernard et al. (2006).
1
of innovation both in early endogenous growth models (Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991)), and
more recent contributions (Aghion et al. (1997), Peretto (1999), Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2005)).
In addition, several papers argue that trade may increase innovation e¤orts precisely through an increase in
competition.2 The latter clearly a¤ects how rms respond to trade liberalisation. Despite the relevance of
these two dimensions, few papers have investigated the consequences of the existence of these two sources of
heterogeneity for the e¤ect that trade liberalisation has on innovation.
The fact that sectors di¤er greatly in the degree of product market competition within a country is a
stylized fact well-documented in the data (Eslava et al. (2009), Gri¢ th et al. (2010)). Epifani and Gancia
(2011) report that in the US manufacturing sector at a four-digit level of disaggregation, mark-ups vary
substantially across industries. The degree of trade openness varies substantially across sectors and this is
the case even for developed economies. Using sectoral data obtained from Bernard et al. (2006), we observe
that average trade costs faced by di¤erent US manufacturing sectors (3-digit NAICS code) during the period
1989-2005 varies considerably from 3% up to 18%. This di¤erence is even larger if we consider a ner level
of disaggregation.
The aim of this paper is to introduce sector heterogeneity in the degree of product market competition
in a standard multi-sector endogenous growth model with private R&D investments, to see how trade a¤ects
innovation and productivity growth at both sectoral and aggregate level. The model is based on the frame-
work developed in Licandro and Navas (2011) that explores the e¤ect of trade liberalisation on innovation
and growth in an oligopolistic general equilibrium model (OLGE) that incorporates process innovation by
incumbent rms. I have focused on this particular framework because the empirical evidence suggests that
this is the most relevant case. Doms and Bartelsman (2000) and Foster et al. (2001) provide empirical
support that innovation by incumbents accounts for the largest proportion of sectoral productivity growth.
Akcigit and Kerr (2010) using the US Census of Manufacturing rms, nd that old and large rms undertake
innovations whose main aim is to encourage productivity improvements, while new and small rms perform
product innovation. Finally, by assuming oligopolistic competition, I allow rms to interact strategically.3
To analyse the impact of this source of sector heterogeneity, I consider the implementation of a common
trade policy in an environment in which sectors di¤er in the degree of product market competition. This
exercise enables us to isolate the contribution of sectoral di¤erences in product market competition to the
relationship between trade and innovation. In this exercise, I consider two alternative scenarios (restricted
entry vs. free entry) and two alternative trade liberalisation policies: a movement from autarky to free
trade and a movement from positive to zero trade costs. In the second policy I consider either an initial
situation in which trade costs are common across sectors or an alternative scenario in which the degree of
trade openness is common across sectors, as explained below. In the six scenarios, trade liberalisation a¤ects
innovation through a joint e¤ect of an increase in market size and an increase in competition. However,
the latter is di¤erent across sectors due to di¤erences in the initial degree of competition. More precisely,
when the countries move from autarky to free trade, the initially less competitive sectors experience a larger
increase in innovation and by extension, sector productivity growth. This is the consequence of the fact
that the increase in competition coming from foreign markets is tougher in sectors which are initially less
competitive. Once the countries are opened to trade, a reduction in trade costs in sectors which start with
the same level of trade barriers increases innovation and sector productivity growth in those sectors that
are initially more competitive. This is the consequence of the fact that, for the same trade barrier, a sector
which is initially more competitive is relatively more closed to foreign trade and a reduction in trade barriers
intensies competition more in those sectors. When I consider instead an alternative scenario in which
all sectors start with the same degree of trade openness, I nd that innovation increases more in the less
2The main mechanism through which trade has an impact on innovation in these papers is the increase in competition. This
could come through di¤erent channels: an e¤ect through direct changes in the protability of R&D: (Peretto (2003), Licandro
and Navas (2011)), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b) etc, and an indirect e¤ect through selection: competition allows only the
most productive rms to survive. The reallocation of market shares and productive resources towards the incumbents contribute
to increase innovation investments. That is the case of the recent contributions with rm heterogeneity (Atkeson and Burstein,
2010).
3 In this paper rms compete a la Cournot. However, most of the results are robust in qualitative terms to alternative
oligopolistic market structures like Bertrand with product di¤erentiation. (These results are available on request).
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competitive sectors. In the six cases, tougher competition increases rm size, promotes innovation and it
generates a reallocation of productive resources across sectors. When I allow for free entry, considering that
the initial level of trade openness is common across sectors, the same competition e¤ect reduces mark-ups by
more in the less competitive sectors. This generates a reallocation of market shares and productive resources
towards incumbents that further contribute to innovation. Consequently, the level of competition that the
sector faces initially becomes an important determinant of the nal e¤ect that trade liberalisation has on
innovation. In Appendix 3, instead, an asymmetric trade liberalisation exercise is explored. I nd that
asymmetric trade liberalisation has a heterogenous impact at a sectoral level. More precisely, rms increase
innovation e¤orts in those sectors that are relatively more open to foreign trade, contributing to a rise in
sectoral TFP growth.
The introduction of sector heterogeneity in the level of competition in the study of the e¤ects of trade on
innovation and productivity growth reveals two important ndings that are absent in a representative sector
analysis. First, this heterogeneity generates important reallocation e¤ects across sectors and across activities
within a sector through general equilibrium e¤ects. This has varied e¤ects on sector productivity growth:
in the case of restricted entry, a common trade liberalisation policy may induce a reduction in productivity
growth in those sectors which are relatively more competitive or, as shown in Appendix 1, those ones more
open to foreign trade. Second, and most important, the existence of these di¤erences across sectors partially
mitigates the benets of trade. In an environment where sectors face identical trade barriers but di¤er in
terms of competition, a movement towards free trade has a positive e¤ect on aggregate productivity growth,
although this e¤ect would be larger if sectors were more homogeneous in terms of competition. Similarly,
when sectors di¤er in trade barriers, a movement towards a common trade barrier has a positive e¤ect
on aggregate productivity growth. The existence of diminishing returns to scale associated with labour
in R&D activities implies that when industries face di¤erent trade barriers there is relatively too much
R&D investment in some industries and relatively too little in other industries. The movement towards a
common trade barrier generates a reallocation of resources from industries that invest relatively too much
(and consequently labour is relatively less productive) to industries that invest relatively too little (and
consequently labour is relatively more productive). Therefore, this paper suggests that when industries
di¤er in these trade barriers and competition due to institutional reasons, the removal of these institutional
barriers helps the economy to enjoy fully the benets of trade.
Although this paper is related to an extensive literature that examines the e¤ects of trade openness and
trade liberalisation on innovation and growth, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst to study
the role of this source of heterogeneity across sectors in innovation and sector productivity growth. Two
related papers in the area are Impulliti and Licandro (2011) and Ederington and Mc Calman (2007). The rst
paper introduces rm heterogeneity into the oligopolistic competition model of Licandro and Navas (2011) to
disentangle the e¤ects of trade openness on sector productivity growth that are derived from selection, from
the e¤ects that are derived from a pure increase in competition. Though their results could be interpreted in
terms of sector heterogeneity, the only source of sector heterogeneity in their model is the initial productivity.
The consequences of the presence of asymmetries in certain policy variables, like the degree of product market
competition or the degree of trade openness, are not explored. Ederington and Mc Calman (2007) explore
the e¤ect of trade liberalisation on the rate of technology adoption in a small open economy. Their paper
nds that unilateral trade liberalisation is likely to delay the adoption date for the median rm. This e¤ect
depends on several sectoral characteristics and the e¤ect is stronger in, for example, more competitive sectors
(low entry costs, large domestic markets). Their model uses a monopolistic competition model in partial
equilibrium. Thus, neither the rich interaction across sectors that emerges in a general equilibrium context,
nor the strategic interaction among rms, which are crucial elements in my model, are explored.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model both in autarky and
trade under restricted entry. In Section 3, I discuss the main results of the counterfactual exercises under
restricted entry. In Section 4 I introduce the more general case in which there is free entry and I discuss the
counterfactual exercises associated with this case. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
Consider an economy that is populated by a continuum of consumers of measure L; with instantaneous
logarithmic preferences dened over two nal consumption goods X and Y :
U(Cx; Cy) =
1Z
0
e t( lnCx + (1  ) lnCy)dt;  > 0;
where Cx; Cy denote the consumption baskets of goods X and Y respectively. Good Y is an homogeneous
good.4 Good X is a di¤erentiated good that takes the following functional form.
Cx =
NY
j=1
(cj)
j ; 0 < j < 1; and
NX
j=1
j = 1: (1)
Here a Cobb-Douglas subutility function between the di¤erent varieties has been assumed with the parameter
j controlling for the weights of each of these goods in a consumers budget. In each of these varieties there
is a continuum of subvarieties of measure Z that are aggregated following the standard CES functional form:
cxj =
0@ ZZ
0
c
j
ij di
1A
1
j
; 0  j < 1; (2)
where the parameter j controls for the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The structure of our
economy distinguishes between sectors (varieties) and subsectors (subvarieties) where we have assumed a
unitary elasticity of substitution across sectors. This preference structure is needed to ensure the existence
of a Balanced Growth Path in which labour allocation across sectors is constant in an environment in which
di¤erences in TFP growth rates across sectors may arise in the steady state (Ngai and Pissarides (2007)).5
This is going to be the case in this paper.
Each subvariety is produced under Cournot competition6 with a number of rms nj which is exogenously
given.7 Each rm produces according to the following technology:
qdij = zdij l
x
dij ; (3)
where qdij denotes the quantity produced by rm d producing subvariety i in sector j; zdij denotes the rms
stock of knowledge and lxdij the rmsallocation of labour to production activities. Firms can also undertake
cost-reducing innovations using the following technology:
_zdij = Bj
 
lzdij

zdij ;  2 (0; 1) ; (4)
which depends on the rms stock of knowledge (zdij), the amount of labour that is devoted to innovation,
lzdij , and Bj which is a technological constant that includes di¤erences in technological opportunities across
4The existence of a traditional good allows for the reallocation of labor to the R&D sector without necessarily reducing the
labor that is assigned to the composite good sector. A similar result would hold under the assumption of elastic labor supply
as in the work of Aghion et al. (2001). Although the relationship between trade and employment is interesting, is not the focus
in this paper.
5This assumption simplies calculations. I have explored the role of the elasticity of substitution across sectors and considered
a version of this model with an innovation function that presents decreasing returns to scale in the accumulation of knowledge as
in Jones (1995). The advantage of such a framework is that the steady state productivity growth rate is identical across sectors
and, therefore, the aggregate TFP growth rate is constant independent of the elasticity of substitution across products. In this
situation, trade may generate temporary di¤erences in productivity growth across sectors but does not generate permanent
di¤erences. The model is able to generate permanent di¤erences in productivity levels across sectors although the qualitative
results are identical to those presented further in the paper.
6Under Cournot competition with rms o¤ering homogeneous goods, the model yields tractable solutions. However, as noted
above, the results derived in this paper are qualitatively more general, and allow for alternative market structures like Bertrand
with product di¤erentiation.
7This assumption will be relaxed in a further section of the paper.
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sectors. In this set-up, the stock of knowledge is rm-specic and there are no technological spillovers among
rms. 8
At any point in time, rms producing the subvariety i decide the quantity to supply and the optimal
allocation of workers for both physical production and R&D, taking into consideration other rmsstrategies.
This game belongs to the family of di¤erential games, or repeated games dened in continuous time, in which
past actions a¤ect current payo¤s. Two di¤erent concepts of Markov perfect Nash equilibria have been
proposed in the literature, the open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium
(CLNE). In an OLNE, a rm initially selects the optimal path of strategies taking the other rmspath
of strategies as given and the rm sticks to this path forever. In contrast, in a CLNE, the rm chooses at
each point in time the set of strategies taking the other rmsstrategies as given. In this sense, an OLNE
is equivalent to a static Nash equilibrium in which the possible strategies are time paths of actions and
the associated payo¤s are innite sums of payo¤s. In this paper I focus on OLNE equilibria mainly for
two reasons. Firstly, the literature has focused on OLNE, mainly because standard optimal control theory
techniques can be applied in order to nd this type of equilibria. Secondly, Licandro and Navas (2011) show
that the OLNE equilibria in this game collapse into the CLNE being game perfect or time-consistent.
The following denition applies for each rm d in the subvariety i of sector j (I omit the subindexes i and
j for simplication). Let ad = [qdT;lzdT ] ; 8 T  t be the strategy of rm d, where [qdT;lzdT ] are the time-paths
of output and R&D workers, and let 
d be the set of possible strategies of rm d. Let Vd be the value of
rm d when the rm plays the strategy path ad and the nj   1 rms in the market, nj > 2, play strategies
a d =

a1; a2; ::::ad 1; ad+1::::anj
	
Denition 1 At time t, Ad = [ad; a

 d] is an open loop Nash equilibrium if,
Vd [Ad]  Vd [A0d]  0;
where A0d = [a
0
d; a

 d] ; 8 a0d 6= ad; 2 
d; 8:d:
This condition implies that the optimal time path of strategies ad maximises the value of rm d taking
as given other rmsoptimal strategies, (a d); and that the value of the rm must be non-negative.
2.1 Solving for the autarkic equilibrium
Let Ei denote the expenditure that is devoted to consumption of the nal goods i = x; y and Exj the
expenditure dedicated to consumption of good j. Consumers solve the standard optimal control problem
8This assumption is made, to isolate the contribution of the increase in competition that is derived from trade openness on
innovation and productivity from other sources (e.g. international R&D spillovers).
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whose rst order conditions are as follows:9
Ex = E; (5)
Ey = (1  )E; (6)
Exj = jE
x; (7)
_E
E
= rt   ; (8)
pj =
LExj
xj
; (9)
pij =

LExj
pjxij
1 j
pj ; (10)
where E is total expenditure in consumption and pj =
 
ZR
0
p
j
j 1
ij di
!j 1
j
; is the standard aggregate price
index.10 Firm d in subvariety i of sector j solves the problem:
Vdijs = max
Z 1
s
Rs;t

(pij   z 1dij)qdij   lzdij

dt; (11)
s:t: pij =

LExj
pjxij
1 j
pj
xij =
njX
d=1
qdij (12)
_zdij = Bj(l
z
dij)
zdij ; 0 <  < 1
zdij0 > 0;
where Rs;t = e 
R t
s
rd is the usual market discount factor. I restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria by
assuming that the initial stock of knowledge is equal for all rms in the same sector i.e. zdij0 = zij0;8 d. In
addition, to ensure simplicity, I assume that the initial productivity is equal across all rms in the economy.
Because I focus on symmetric equilibria I omit the subscript d for the sake of simplicity. Deriving rst order
conditions, rearranging terms and applying symmetry, I obtain:
qij = jzij ljE
x
j ; (13)
1 = vijBj(l
z
ij)
 1zij ; (14)
z 2
ij
qij
vij
+Bj
 
lzij

=
  _vij
vij
+ r; (15)
9The consumers solve the following optimal control problem:
Max U(Cx; Cy)
s.t. conditions 1 and 2 and the budget constraint which is given by:
NX
j=1
1Z
0
pijcijdi+ C
y + _S = wL+ rS
S are the only nancial assets in this economy. These are shares of the existing rms. We are assuming that to nance new
investments in R&D, rms are creating new shares. In equilibrium the value of these shares is equal to the expected discounted
value of prots of all existing rms in the economy. Therefore, positive prots, which is going to be an equilibrium feature in
the version of the model with an exogenous number of rms, are redistributed across consumers by means of these shares.
10This is the inverse of the standard demand function derived in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework:
xij =

LExj
pj

pij
pj
 1
j 1 :
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where vij is the costate variable associated with zij and j  nj 1+jnj is the inverse of the markup rate. I
denote lj as LnjZ the market share of the rm.
The left hand side of condition (15) is the marginal gain of accumulating one additional unit of knowledge.
This increases with the quantity supplied as it determines the amount of resources that are saved as a result
of such a reduction in production costs.
Given that the quantity that is produced determines innovation e¤ort, the way in which quantities are
determined is fundamental for innovation. This is shown in equation (13). In this model, an increase in
the number of rms generates two di¤erent and opposing e¤ects. First, the increase in the number of
rms decreases the rms residual demand since now a larger number of rms must serve the same mass
of consumers. This decreases the rms output, as shown in the last term of condition (13). This is the
size e¤ect or the market share e¤ect. Second, the increase in the number of rms increases the perceived
elasticity of demand. Since rms are facing a more elastic demand this provides an incentive for rms to
increase the quantity supplied in the market which decreases the equilibrium price and the rmsmark-up.
This e¤ect is captured by the rst element of equation (13). j is the inverse of the mark-up, which depends
positively on the number of rms nj:11 This is the competition e¤ect.
Dene lfij = l
x
ij + l
z
ij , the rms employment. To complete the model, I must impose the market clearing
conditions for all markets. In the case of the labour market:
NX
j=1
ZZ
0
nj l
f
ijdi+ L
y = L: (16)
Each nal good market must satisfy:
Lcij = xij
The nancial market-clearing condition implies that the aggregate asset demand LS is equal to the stock
market value of rms:
LS =
NX
j=1
ZZ
0
njVijdi: (17)
Finally, let us impose the market-clearing condition in sector Y :
LEy = Ly: (18)
Notice that the set of optimal strategies across varieties depends on the rms initial stock of knowledge,
which is assumed to be common across rms, varieties, and sectors. In the next set of results I omit the
subscript i for simplicity. A Balanced Growth Path in this economy is a situation when the variables
qj ; xj ; zj ; vj and pj grow at a constant rate and the variables lxj ; l
z
j ; l
f
j ; L
x; Lz; Ly; r; E;Exj ; E
x; Ey and qy are
constant. In Appendix 1 we show that:
Proposition 2 A BGP for this economy exists and is unique
Proof. See Appendix 1 (section 7.1)
More precisely, the growth rate of output either at a rm level qj or at a sectoral level xj is given by:
_zj
zj
= Bj
 
lzj

11This positive relationship comes through the e¤ect that nj has on the perceived elasticity of demand. To see this notice
that the mark-up j is given by: j =
1
1 ~"j where ~"j is the inverse of the perceived elasticity of demand ~"j = sj"j where sj
is the market share of the rm and "j the inverse of the elasticity of demand (1  j): An increase in nj or an increase in j
increases the perceived elasticity of demand.
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so the sectoral growth rate of output is uniquely determined by the productivity of workers in the research
sector Bj and the per-rm labour allocation to research lzj : By considering equation (15) in steady state and
the fact that the returns on innovation must be equal across sectors I obtain an expression for the allocation
of R&D labour across sectors which is given by: 12
lzj
lzk
=

Bj
Bk
lxj
lxk
 1
1 
(19)
This equation shows the complementarity between production and innovation activities in this set-up. In
those sectors in which each rm produces more, each rm is going to dedicate relatively more labour to
R&D. The labour in production activities is allocated across sectors according to the following condition:
lxj
lxk
=
j
k
j
k
nk
nj
(20)
Conditions (19) and (20) reveal how the increase in competition may a¤ect rmsinnovation e¤orts under
this set-up. On the one hand the rms labour demands for production and innovation activities are smaller
in more competitive sectors through the size e¤ect. This can be seen in the third term of the left hand
side of condition (20). However, sectors with a larger number of rms have lower mark-ups and a larger 
through the competition e¤ect. Consequently these sectors dedicate more resources to both production and
innovation. This can be seen through the second element of the left hand side of condition (20). The net
e¤ect in both production and innovation is the combination of these two e¤ects, the size and the competition
e¤ect.
A convenient property of this model is that the steady state solution can be summarised in a single
non-linear equation, as follows: 
(1  ) + ~
~k
!

Bk
(lzk)
1 
+
0@ NX
j=1
 
~j
~k
Bj
Bk
! 1
1  
nk
nj
 
1 
1A lzk = lk (21)
where ~ is a size-weighted average of the degree of competition across sectors
0@i:e: NX
j=1
~j
1A where ~j = jj
is a measure of the degree of competition of sector j, weighted by the importance that sector j has in total
expenditure in the manufacturing sector. 13
The following propositions discuss how labour in research and development and the sectoral TFP growth
rate respond when either the elasticity of substitution or the number of rms change in just one sector. This
distinction is interesting since the increase in the degree of substitutability across products in sector k; k;
a¤ects innovation e¤orts only through the competition e¤ect. A change in k only changes the perceived
elasticity of demand through changes in the elasticity of substitution across varieties. This e¤ect is entirely
captured by the variable k: Analysing how innovation e¤orts respond to changes in these two variables
allows us to compare how the competition and the size e¤ects directly a¤ect a rms innovation e¤orts under
this set-up. This is useful to understand the e¤ects of trade openness on innovation. Finally, I analyse how
changes in these parameters in one sector a¤ect a rms innovation e¤ort in another sector. This outlines
the importance of the reallocation e¤ects across sectors that emerge when asymmetries are introduced.
Proposition 3 An increase in k increases the per-rm resources devoted to R&D in sector k:

@lzk
@k
> 0

:
Proof. See Appendix 1. (section 7.2.1.)
From this proposition, it follows that the competition e¤ect positively a¤ects innovation e¤orts. The
increase in the perceived elasticity of demand increases a rms labour demand for production and innovation
activities. This increases rmsinnovation e¤orts.
12Further details on how to derive the following results are provided in Appendix 1 (section 7.1)
13Details about the derivation of equation (21) are provided in Appendix 1 (section 7.1.).
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Proposition 4 An increase in nk decreases the rms R&D employment in sector k

@lzk
@nk
< 0

:
Proof. See Appendix 1.(section 7.2.2).
However, the increase in the number of rms decreases the rms R&D employment in sector k: The
main di¤erence with respect to the case above is that when we increase nk both the competition e¤ect and
the size e¤ect are at work. This proposition not only suggests that the size e¤ect decreases a rmslabour
demand for production and innovation activities, it also implies that the size e¤ect is the dominant one, as it
is standard in the Cournot model. Therefore, an increase in the number of rms decreases rm size having
a negative impact on innovation e¤orts.
Proposition 5 Consider a sector h 6= k: An increase in h decreases the per-rm resources devoted to R&D
in sector k:

@lzk
@h
< 0;

: For the case of an increase in nh; we have that:
@lzk
@nh
< 0; if nh <
(1 h)(1+)
 :
Proof. See Appendix 1.(section 7.2.3).
An increase in either the degree of substitutability across products or the number of rms in sector h
decreases the rms resources that are allocated to innovation in sector k. In the case of h, the e¤ect is
straightforward: the increase in h increases labour demand for production and research activities in sector
h: This induces a labour reallocation from the other sectors to sector h. In the case of nh; the e¤ect is similar.
In this case, the rms labour demand decreases but the sectors increases provided that nh <
(1 h)(1+)
 :
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This generates a reallocation e¤ect from the other sectors to sector h: Interestingly, this general equilibrium
e¤ect is shaped by the importance of sector h in the consumers budget (h) : As h approaches zero, this
e¤ect is negligible.
Therefore, in autarky, an increase in the number of rms produces a negative e¤ect on innovation through
the combination of both the competition and the size e¤ect. In the next section I explore what happens when
the economy opens to trade and we will see how this negative size e¤ect is compensated by an increase in the
market size of the rm. The introduction of asymmetries across sectors generates an interesting reallocation
e¤ect towards production and innovation in some sectors that ultimately a¤ects the sector both statically,
through a change in the quantity produced and dynamically favoring productivity growth in some sectors to
the detriment of others.
2.2 Trade
Assume that the economy is open to trade with M identical economies. To serve a foreign market, rms pay
a transportation cost of the iceberg type (i.e. rms need to ship (1 +  j) units of the good to get one unit
sold abroad). Let qdij ; be the quantity that rm d producing subvariety i in sector j produces in its local
market and qmdij denote the quantity that each rm d in sector j supplies to country m: Since I assume that
all countries are identical, I focus again on symmetric equilibrium ( qdij = qj ; qmdij = q

j ). Solving the open
economy version of problem (11) I obtain the following rst order conditions: 
LExj
nj(qj +Mqj )pj
!1 
pj
 
1  (1  j)qj
nj(qj +Mqj )
!
= z 1j (22)
 
LExj
nj(qj +Mqj )pj
!1 
pj
 
1  (1  j)q

j
nj(qj +Mqj )
!
= z 1j (1 +  j) (23)
1 = vjBj(l
z
j )
 1zj ; j = 1; 2 (24)
z 2j
 
qj +M(1 +  j)q

j

vj
+
 
lzj

Bj =
  _vj
vj
+ r; j = 1; 2 (25)
14To be precise, the industry h labor demand for production activities increases with the number of rms nh: However the
labor demand for R&D activities increases with nh if nh <
(1 h)(1+)

:
9
Firms consider the total volume of production when selecting the amount of resources to devote to R&D as
can be seen in (25). Dividing (22) by (23) and rearranging terms, I obtain:
qj =
(1 +  j) (1  j)   jnj
1  j +Mnj j qj (26)
(26) implies an interesting result. Manipulating (26) I deduce that if
 j  1  j
nj   1 + j (27)
then qj = 0: Unlike the monopolistic competition model where the CES preference structure ensures that
all rms have positive trade ows independently of the trade cost, trade exists in this economy if and only if
trade costs are not excessively high. This is the consequence of the fact that foreign goods and home goods
are perfect substitutes. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for foreign rms to survive in a local market
is that the cost disadvantage that is introduced by transportation costs is not too large.15 Substituting in
(22), and rearranging terms yields:
qj =
((1 +M)nj   1 + j))(1  j +M jnj)
nj(1  j) (1 +M(1 +  j))2
zj ljE
x
j
and substituting in (26)
qj =
((1 +M)nj   1 + j) ((1 +  j) (1  j)   jnj))
nj(1  j)(1 +M(1 +  j))2 zj ljE
x
j :
The rms output Qj = qj +M(1 +  j)qj can be expressed as:
Qj = 
0
jzj ljE
x
j ;
where
0j =
((1 +M)nj   1 + j)

(1 M + 2M(1 +  j)) (1  j) + 2j (1  j   nj)

nj(1  j)(1 +M(1 +  j))2 : (28)
The steady state solution of the model can be summed up in an equation similar to the autarkic case. More
precisely,  
(1  ) + ~0
~
0
k
!

Bk
(lzk)
1 
+
0@ NX
j=1
 
~
0
j
~
0
k
Bj
Bk
! 1
1  
nj
nk
 
1 
1A lzk = lk: (29)
where ~
0
k = k
0
k and ~
0
=
NX
j=1
j
0
j : This condition is analogous to the one in autarky but with the new
value for the parameter 0j :
In Appendix 1 (section 7.3), I show that 0j > j : Consequently, trade has intensied competition.
However, the negative impact that the increase in the number of competitors was having on production
and innovation e¤orts is o¤set by the increase in the market size. Licandro and Navas (2011) reveal that
a movement from autarky to free trade, or a trade liberalisation (understood as a decrease in trade costs)
increases employment in the R&D sector, and this increased employment has positive e¤ects on innovation
and productivity growth in a situation with perfect symmetry across sectors. This comes through the positive
e¤ect that trade has on competition (i.e. the competition e¤ect). The focus of this paper is to demonstrate
how the situation changes when we allow for sectoral di¤erences (in this context, di¤erences in competition
15The fact that foreign rms are able to serve the foreign market at a higher cost even if the goods that domestic and foreign
rms are producing are identical is not new in the literature and goes back to the seminal paper of Brander (1981). This
phenomenon is known as cross-hauling and arises in this environment due to: 1. Firms o¤ering homogeneous products are
competing à la Cournot. 2. Short-run regulations that limit the entry of domestic rms (restricted entry). 3. In the case of
free-entry, internal economies of scale.
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Parameter Value Source
 0.0375 World Bank Development Indicators
 0.91 World Bank Development Indicators
 0.08 Ngai and Samaniego (2011)
B 0.020 Calibrated internally
L=Z 23364 US labor force from BLS
 0.5 Free
 0 Free
M 1 Free
Table 1: Parameter choice under restricted entry
levels) or when we have a process of trade liberalisation that is not symmetric across sectors. I rely on
numerical methods to demonstrate these results.
In the numerical analysis, I consider two di¤erent scenarios, one with restricted entry and another one
with free entry. The rst exercise allows us to identify the main forces determining the varied e¤ect of
trade openness on innovation in the more general case when I allow for free entry. Table 1 provides us with
information regarding the sources of the values used for each parameter.16 In the restricted entry scenario, I
consider the case of two sectors without loss of generality. I also assume that Bj ; is common across sectors.
The latter provides a better picture of how di¤erences in the two dimensions I explore a¤ect innovation.
From (15) in steady state I obtain:
Bj =
nj l
z
j
nj lxj


 
lzj
 
With  very close to zero, which is the case in this paper, the third term can be ignored, and this technological
constant can be proxied as: B = 
Lz
Lx
: To calibrate this parameter, I rely on the share of the sectoral labour
force devoted to R&D activities provided by the National Science Foundation which is 4.43%.17 This implies
that the technological constant should take the value: B = 0:020:
The next section discuss in detail the results under the restricted entry scenario.
3 Results Under Restricted Entry
3.1 From Autarky to Free Trade
In this subsection I consider the case in which both sectors move from autarky to free trade but the sectors
di¤er in the degree of product market competition. The number of rms in sector 1 is xed at 2 for simplicity,
while I let the number of rms in sector 2 vary. The results are reported in gure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The horizontal axis in both panels represents the number of rms in sector 2. When there are no
di¤erences in competition (two rms in each sector), R&D employment increases by 6% as a consequence
of trade openness. However, if sector 2 is more competitive, trade openness increases R&D employment to
16The following sources have been considered for the parameter values:
To obtain the value of ; I consider the manufacturing sector to be the di¤erentiated sector of the economy. The World
Development Indicators database reports that manufacturing represents 25% of total GDP for the US economy which implies
a share of 91% of the total GDP net services. Services are excluded from our analysis due to the non-tradable nature of this
component of GDP.
To obtain the value of  I rely on the previous work by Ngai and Samaniego (2011). In their paper, new knowledge is entirely
produced using an intermediate research input with technology similar to my paper. The elasticity of new knowledge to this
intermediate research input is equal to 0.13. This research intemediate good is produced with physical capital and labor using
a Cobb-Douglas technology. The intermediate inputs labor share is 0.6. The elasticity of R&D to research labour is therefore
 = 0:6 x 0:13 = 0:078:
For the free parameters I have performed robustness checks which are available on request.
17That is around 1% of the total labor force in the US.
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a greater extent in the less competitive sector. Moreover, if the di¤erences in competition are large enough,
the per-rm investment in R&D in sector 2 falls as a consequence of trade liberalisation. This result is the
combination of two di¤erent e¤ects: the competition e¤ect and the general equilibrium e¤ect; the increase
in the perceived elasticity of demand is larger for sectors that are initially less competitive in autarky. This
is a standard feature in oligopolistic competition models. This implies that trade intensies competition to
a greater degree in those sectors. As a result, rms increase the volume of production and the investment
in research to a greater extent in those sectors. As the labour demand increases to a greater extent in the
less competitive sector, general equilibrium e¤ects induce a labour reallocation from the more competitive
sector to the less competitive one.
3.2 From positive trade costs to Free Trade.
In this subsection, I consider the case in which the economy is already opened to international trade. In
order to isolate how di¤erences in competition are shaping the e¤ects of trade liberalisation on innovation, I
consider two initial situations: one in which sectors have common trade costs and another in which sectors
start with the same level of trade openness. In both cases sectors move towards free trade. The results for
the rst case are represented in gure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
For this gure, I set the initial variable trade cost  = 0:08:18 Panel A shows the variation in percentage
points of R&D employment in sector 1 while panel B presents the same results for sector 2. Contrary
to our previous case, the larger increase in R&D employment following trade liberalisation is in the more
competitive sector. This apparently paradoxical result is the main consequence of two di¤erent results: rst,
the degree of trade openness in one sector depends on the number of rms in that sector and second the
competition e¤ect is stronger the relatively more closed the sector is to foreign trade. To understand this, it
is useful to look at equation (27) which displays the upper-bound limit for trade costs. Above this threshold,
rms cannot export. It depends on the number of rms in the sector, being smaller in the more competitive
sectors.19 Consider now a common trade barrier  across both industries. For the most competitive sector,
the common trade barrier is closer to the upper bound and consequently that sector is relatively more closed
to foreign trade than the less competitive one. A movement to free trade has a stronger impact in the sector
relatively more closed to foreign trade, or the most competitive sector. In this framework, having a common
trade cost across sectors does not mean that these sectors are equally exposed to foreign trade.20
In a second scenario, I have controlled for this by considering that the initial trade cost in each sector
is the one that ensures that both sectors have the same degree of trade openness. The results are reported
in gure 3. As it can be observed, once sectors are equally exposed to foreign trade, moving to free trade
increases innovation to a greater extent in the less competitive sector.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
To assess the impact of asymmetric trade liberalisation, I consider an initial situation in which both
sectors are identical. However, a trade policy will be implemented in sector 1 but will not be implemented
in sector 2. R&D employment increases in the liberalised sector and decreases in the non-liberalised sector.
Interestingly, the function is concave indicating that the e¤ect is stronger when those sectors are relatively
more closed to foreign trade. These results are provided in Appendix 3 (section 9.1.).
In the next section I show the extent to which these results are reinforced in a more general case in which
there is free entry.
18The average across the industries used in the sample is 7.85%. The latter comes from an updated version of the database
on trade barriers built in Bernard et al. (2006) (see next section for details). In the next section I use this database to pin
down industrial measures of trade barriers.
19 In the more competitive sectors, the residual demand faced by foreign rms is smaller and more elastic. Di¤erences in the
costs of serving the foreign market in these sectors reduce drastically the possibilities that a rm can export.
20Alternatively I can compute the degree of trade openness as (Exports+Imports)/GDP which for the same degree of trade
barriers, is clearly decreasing in the number of rms. (See Appendix 1 (section 7.4))
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4 Free Entry
4.1 Theory
The case of free entry brings a new interesting mechanism through which trade contributes to innovation:
the "selection e¤ect". The increase in competition from foreign markets reduces mark-ups and prots, and
induces exit. The number of rms serving each market falls until the zero prot condition holds again. The
market share of the newly inactive rms is reallocated towards the survivors and this provides additional
incentives to engage in more innovation. The way in which I take into account the selection e¤ect in this
paper di¤ers from current models of trade with rm heterogeneity. Since all rms are identical, the model
does not provide a criterion to identify which rms remain inoperative. It may be also the case that the size
of this selection e¤ect di¤ers substantially from a model with heterogeneous rms.21
To introduce free entry, I assume that each rm pays a per period xed cost in terms of the numeraire.
The two main modications with respect to the above model are, rstly, the labour market condition:
NX
j=1
ZZ
0
nj

lfij + fj

di+ Ly = L: (30)
and secondly the new zero prot condition which determines the mass of active rms per product. I focus
on a symmetric equilibrium. Firstly, obtaining an expression for a rms prots:
ijt = pjtqjt   lxjt   lzjt   fj = 0
Substituting the expression for a rms´ revenue, and rearranging terms yields:
1  j
j

lxj = l
z
j + fj : (31)
Substituting (31) into (30) and rearranging terms, I obtain:
lxk = kklk:
Substituting in the prot function, and rearranging terms I obtain:
 (1  j)j lj  



Bjjj lj
 1
1 
= fj ;
which is a non-linear equation in nj : The case with trade is analogous with 
0
j instead of j :
To see how our results change in the most general case (free entry), I undertake analogous counterfactual
exercises to those presented in section 3.22
In this model, the existence of xed operational costs is an important ingredient in determining the
number of rms active in each sector. To the best of my knowledge there is no reliable data on xed
operational costs at a sector level. To proxy this parameter, I use an average of the xed costs obtained
from the World Bank Doing Business Database built initially by Djankov et al. (2002), which measures for
each country, the cost of starting-up a business. For the case of the US it takes, on average, 6 procedures to
start-up a business with a total cost of 6 working days and a monetary cost of 1% the countrys per capita
GDP. The total cost is consequently $1146. Since in our model there is no exit, I assume that the entry cost
21To the best of my knowledge, there are only two relevant papers that incorporate the selection e¤ect in an oligopolistic
model with rm heterogeneity and innovation. The rst is Impulliti and Licandro (2011). In their model, they have two selection
e¤ects: the selection e¤ect within varieties, which is identical to the one in this model, and selection across varieties. Since in
their model rms producing the same variety are identical, they also do not consider the e¤ect of selection in an environment in
which heterogenous rms produce the same variety. The other paper is Long et al.(2011) which incorporates a selection e¤ect
along the lines discussed above. Their model however is static, and this simplies the analysis at some expense. In addition,
they do not explore di¤erences across sectors.
22As in the restricted entry case, the results for asymmetric trade liberalisation are provided in Appendix 3 (section 9.2).
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is paid in a per period xed cost of fj = rfe; so this gives us a xed cost of $43. In the calibration exercise,
variation across sectors in the degree of product market competition comes from di¤erences in technological
opportunities (Bj) or trade costs across sectors ( j). To pin down Bj ; I pursue a similar strategy to the
restricted entry case but I use sectoral data on the share of the labour force that was engaged in R&D
activities in 2004 obtained from the National Science Foundation (NSF).23 For the trade costs  j ; I have
computed an average of trade costs for the period 1989-2005 using an upgraded version of the database
constructed by Bernard et al. (2006).24
4.2 Results
To be consistent with the restricted entry case, I consider an economy with a common degree of trade
openness but with di¤erences in competition, these di¤erences arising as a result of technological di¤erences
in R&D. Then I consider a movement towards free trade. Since the degree of trade openness is identical
across sectors but sectors di¤er in the degree of product market competition, this exercise is the equivalent
to the second exercise discussed in section 3.2.25
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
In panel A of gure 4 I show how the number of rms changes when the sectors move towards zero
trade costs. Industries are less populated. The reduction in the number of rms, however, is stronger in the
initially less competitive sectors. This result is a combination of the pro-competitive result of Cournot and
the fact that the less competitive sectors start with a relatively higher level of trade costs (since, as discussed
in the previous section, for the same level of trade costs they are relatively more open to free trade). The
e¤ect on the mark-up is negative but stronger in the initially more competitive sectors. The large fall in
domestic rms that su¤ers the initially less competitive ones mitigates partially both the pro-competitive
e¤ect and the e¤ect of the trade cost.
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
The movement towards free trade would bring a substantial reallocation of employment towards produc-
tion and innovation, but this increase is not equally shared across all manufacturing sectors. More precisely
the less competitive ones experience a larger increase in employment (Panel A in Figure 5). This reallocation
is stronger in innovation activities, suggesting that within a rm there is a reallocation from production to
innovation (Panel B). The former result is basically the consequence of the fact that the less competitive
sectors su¤er from a larger fall in trade barriers, a stronger pro-competitive e¤ect but, above all, a larger
fall in the number of surviving rms. This generates a reallocation of resources towards the incumbents.
Panel D in gure 5 suggests a very interesting result and this di¤ers from the case with restricted entry.
Almost all of the reallocation of labour that we have observed in the previous gure is not coming from a
reallocation of labour across sectors but from a reallocation across activities within a sector. That is, in the
less competitive sectors, the number of rms falls to a greater extent, and labour is reallocated towards the
incumbent rms. The model also suggests that the change in trade costs generates a reallocation e¤ect from
production to innovation activities.
To see the importance of this asymmetry on the potential e¤ects of trade on aggregate productivity
growth, I have computed the increase in productivity growth that results from a movement from a common
trade cost towards free trade when there are no di¤erences in product market competition (being the tech-
nological constant common across sectors and equal to the average value). Compared to an initial situation
23 I use a 3-digit level of disaggregation because this is the nest level for which the share of the labor force engaged in R&D
activities across sectors is available. In Appendix 2, I provide additional information regarding how the model matches the data
on markups.
24 In that paper, the authors compute the value of duties and transportation costs for each of the 6-digit US manufacturing
industries using the underlying product-level US import data compiled by Feenstra (1996). To obtain an aggregate measure of
the trade costs for each of the 3-digit sectors, I take for each year a weighted average of the trade costs for each of the 6 digit
products using the import shares as weights.
25An interesting exercise in which industries face a common trade barrier but they exhibit di¤erences in the degree of product
market competition, which is analogous also to the rst exercise of section 3.2, is discussed in the Appendix 4.
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in which industries di¤er in competition but share the same trade barrier, the increase in the aggregate
productivity growth will be 0.0040 which is 5% larger than in the case of which we have asymmetries across
sectors. Analogously I also obtain that in an environment in which there are di¤erences in trade barriers
across sectors, moving to a common trade cost (which is the average of the previous trade costs) increases
the aggregate productivity growth by approximately 0.004 points. Although small, these exercises suggests
that asymmetries across sectors due to di¤erences in product market competition or trade costs limit the
potential benets of trade.
5 Conclusions
Empirical evidence suggests that there is substantial variation in mark-ups and trade barriers across sectors.
In this paper, I explore how these two sources of heterogeneity a¤ect the impact of trade liberalisation on
innovation both at a sector and aggregate level. To do so, I consider a multi-sector endogenous growth model
with oligopolistic competition in which incumbent rms undertake process innovation. Then, I consider either
a movement from autarky or positive trade costs towards free trade in two alternative scenarios: restricted
and free entry.
I nd that a sectors degree of product market competition is a key determinant of the impact of trade
on innovation. A movement from autarky to free trade increases innovation e¤orts in those sectors which
are initially less competitive. This is the consequence of the fact that the increase in competition coming
from foreign markets is tougher in sectors which are initially less competitive. This result is robust to
an alternative scenario where sectors start with positive trade costs and the degree of trade openness is
common across sectors. In all cases, tougher competition increases rm size and promotes innovation in
those sectors and it generates a reallocation of productive resources towards these sectors. When I allow
for free entry, the same competition e¤ect reduces the mass of active rms by more in the less competitive
sectors. This generates a reallocation of market shares and productive resources towards incumbents that
further contributes to innovation. Interestingly, when the number of rms is endogenous, the reallocation
of productive resources occurs across activities within the same sector, but there is little reallocation across
sectors. I nd also that an asymmetric trade liberalisation policy generates substantially di¤erent e¤ects on
innovation across sectors. Innovation increases in those sectors that reduce trade barriers and this is larger in
those sectors that benet from a larger reduction. This result is reinforced in the case of free entry, because
the reduction in trade costs reduces the mass of active rms in the sector. Market shares and productive
resources are reallocated towards the surviving rms which serve to increase rm size and innovation e¤orts.
The paper also outlines the importance of these di¤erences in the impact that trade liberalisation has on
aggregate productivity growth. The existence of these sources of heterogeneity either in the degree of trade
openness or in the degree of product market competition limits the impact that trade has on innovation
at an aggregate level. A movement towards a common trade cost could generate an increase in aggregate
productivity growth. Similarly, when sectors start with identical trade barriers, a movement towards free
trade has a stronger impact on aggregate productivity growth when sectors are more homogeneous in terms
of competition.
This paper could be extended in two directions. The rst could include rm heterogeneity and investigate
how between-sector heterogeneity in these two dimensions and within-sector heterogeneity interplays on the
e¤ect that trade has on average productivity and innovation. The second could explore recent episodes of
unilateral trade liberalisation policies in a model that allows for asymmetries across countries. Given that
unilateral trade liberalisation policies have been increasing in the last decade (Baldwin (2010)), this seems
to be a promising area for future research.
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7 Appendix 1 Mathematical Appendix
7.1 Balanced Growth Path
A Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is an equilibrium path in which variables lxj ; l
z
j ; l
f
j ; L
x; Lz; Ly; r; E;Exj ; E
x; Ey
and qy; are constant and qj ; xj ; zj ; vj and pj grow at a constant rate. I will show that a BGP exists and is
unique. Notice that lxj ; l
z
j ; l
f
j ; L
y are constant in BGP since they are upper and lower bounded from condition
(16).
Symmetric equilibria imply that qdij = qj; 8i; d: From (12), this implies that xij = xj = njqj : It follows
from (10) that pij = pj : Using this in (10), I obtain, pj =
LExj
Zxj
=
LExj
Znjqj
: Substituting the last condition in
(13), yields the following:
pj =
1
j
(zj)
 1
: (32)
Using (3) under symmetry, notice that
Znjpjqj =
nj
j
Zlxj : (33)
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Using (9) and (7), I obtain :
nj
j
Zlxj =
j
k
nk
k
Zlxk
and then
lxj
lxk
=
j
k
j
k
nk
nj
(34)
Constant E implies that r = : Using this and combining (4), (13), (14) and (15), I obtain the following
equation
Bj(l
z
j )
 1lxj = Bk(l
z
k)
 1lxk = : j; k = 1; 2; :::N: (35)
To obtain an expression for the equilibrium allocation of workers across activities and sectors, note from (35)
that:
lxj =

Bj
 
lzj
1 
(36)
Now let us obtain condition (21). Consider rst, the labour market clearing condition under symmetry:
Z
0@ NX
j=1
nj l
f
j
1A+ Ly = L: (37)
From the production function I have that
lxj = z
 1
j qj
and substituting (13) under symmetric equilibria I have that:
lxj = z
 1
j jzj ljE
x
j =
j
nj
j
LEx
Z
(38)
This implies that Zlxj =
j
nj
jLE
x: This leads to,
Lxj =
NX
j=1
njZl
x
j dj =
NX
j=1
nj
j
nj
jLE
x = ~LEx
Since in steady state lxj ; l
z
j L
y are constant. From (5), (6) and (18):
Ly =
1  

LEx (39)
Notice that from (38) (the corresponding one to sector k):
LEx =
Znk
kk
lxk =
Znk
~k

Bk
(lzk)
1  (40)
where the last equality comes from substituting (36) in the previous equation. Then:
Lx + Ly =
 
~ + 1 
~k
!
Znk

Bk
(lzk)
1 
=
 
~ + 1  
~k
!
Znk

Bk
(lzk)
1  (41)
where ~ =
NX
j=1
jj
To get an expression for total labour in R&D I use (36) and (34) to obtain:
Lz = Z
0@ NX
j=1
nj l
z
j
1A = Z
0@ NX
j 6=k
nj

lxj
lxk
Bj
Bk
 1
1 
lzk + nkl
z
k
1A = Z
0@ NX
j 6=k
nj

~j
~k
nk
nj
Bj
Bk
 1
1 
+ nk
1A lzk
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and working through this expression I get:
Lz = Z
0@ NX
j=1
nj
nk
 
~j
~k
nk
nj
Bj
Bk
! 1
1 
1Anklzk (42)
Substituting (41) and (42) in (16) and dividing both sides by Znk I get:0@ (1  ) + 

~

~k
1A 
Bk
(lzk)
1 
+
0@ NX
j=1
 
~j
~k
Bj
Bk
! 1
1  
nk
nj
 
1 
1A lzk = lk
where lk = LZnk : Notice that
_qj
qj
=
_xj
xj
=
_zj
zj
= Bj
 
lzj
 
and _pjpj =
_vj
vj
=   _zjzj :
The proof for the existence and uniqueness of the BGP is straightforward.
Proof. The BGP exists if a solution to equation (21) exists. This is due to the fact that all variables in
steady state collapse to some function of lzk and the parameters of the model. Denote the left hand side of
(21) as f(lzk): f(l
z
k) is a continous function in the interval [0; lk] : It is monotonically increasing in l
z
k and
satises the limit conditions limlzk!0 f(l
z
k) = 0 and limlzk!l f(l
z
k) > lk. Existence and uniqueness is directly
implied by the intermediate value theorem.
Notice that if  = 12 ; j = k, Bk = 1 8 k; and j = k (i.e. nj = nk; j = k); the previous equation is
equal to that derived in Licandro and Navas (2011).
7.1.1 Trade (Equation 29)
In trade rms solve the following optimization problem:
Vdijs = max
Z 1
s
Rs;t
"
(pij   z 1dij)qdij +
MX
m=1
(pmij   z 1dij(1 +  j))qmdij   lzdij
#
dt; (43)
s:t: pij =

LExj
pjxij
1 j
pj
pmij =
 
LExj
pmj x

ij
!1 j
pmj (44)
xij = x
m
ij =
njX
d=1
qdij +
MX
m=1
njX
d=1
qmdij
_zdij = Bj(l
z
dij)
zdij ; 0 <  < 1
zdij0 > 0;
Focusing on symmetric equilibrium, I obtain conditions (22-25) in the main paper. For obtaining the steady
state of the model, I proceed as above, realizing that lxj = z
 1(qj +M(1 +  j)qj )
lxj = z
 1
j 
0
jzj ljE
x
j =
0j
nj
j
LEx
Z
(45)
so following the previous steps, replacing j by 
0
j leads to the same expression.
7.2 Proof of propositions
7.2.1 Proof of proposition 3
Proof. Notice that:
@lzk
@k
=
@lzk
@k
@k
@k
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since the e¤ects of k on lzk are all coming through k: Notice that
@k
@k
> 0. In order to show that @l
z
k
@k
> 0,
we need to show that @l
z
k
@k
> 0 Totally di¤erentiating condition (21) and rearranging terms, we have that:
@lzk
@k
=
0B@ 1 
~k
+
NX
j 6=k

~j
~k
1CA 1k  Bk (lzk)1 +( 11  )
NX
j 6=k

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1 

1
k

lzk
(1 )

~+1 
~k


Bk
(lzk)
 
+
0B@ NX
j=1

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1 
1CA
> 0:
7.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. To show that @l
z
k
@nk
< 0, I totally di¤erentiate condition (21) obtaining the following expression:
@lzk
@nk
=
 L
Z(nk)
2 +
0B@ 1 
~k
+
NX
j 6=k

~j
~k
1CA 1k  Bk (lzk)1  @k@nk 
NX
j 6=k

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1  lzk
h

1 
1
nk
  11  1k
@k
@nk
i
(1 )

~+1 
~k


Bk
(lzk)
 
+
0B@ NX
j=1

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1 
1CA
Rearranging terms, I derive the following expression:
@lzk
@nk
=
 L
Z(nk)
2 +
@k
@nk
1
k
	+ 1 

@k
@nk
1
k
  1nk
 NX
j 6=k

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1  lzk
(1 )

~+1 
~k


Bk
(lzk)
 
+
0B@ NX
j=1

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1 
1CA
where 	 =
240@ 1 
~k
+
NX
j 6=k

~j
~k
1A 
Bk
(lzk)
1 
+
NX
j 6=k

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1 

nk
nj
 
1 
lzk
35 :
Using condition (21) I have that:
	 =
L
Znk
  
Bk
(lzk)
1    lzk (46)
Substituting (46) in the equation above and rearranging terms, I have that:
@lzk
@nk
=
L
Z(nk)

@k
@nk
1
k
  1nk

 

@k
@nk
1
k


Bk
(lzk)
1 +lzk

+ 1 

@k
@nk
1
k
  1nk
 NX
j 6=k

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1  lzk
(1 )

~+1 
~k


Bk
(lzk)
 
+
0B@ NX
j=1

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1 
1CA
This is negative i¤

@k
@nk
1
k
  1nk

< 0:This condition holds as:
@k
@nk
<
k
nk
@k
@nk
= (1 k)
(nk)
2 while knk =
nk 1+k
(nk)
2 : Rearranging terms, the last inequality implies that:
nk > 2 (1  k)
This is satised since we have assumed that nk  2:
7.2.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. I rst show that @l
z
k
@h
< 0:
As in the proof of proposition 2 @l
z
k
@h
=
@lzk
@h
@h
@h
and since @h@h > 0;
@lzk
@h
< 0, @lzk@h < 0:
Totally di¤erentiating condition (21) and rearranging terms I obtain:
@lzk
@h
=
 

h
kk


Bk
(lzk)
1 +( 11  )

hBh
kkBk
 1
1 

nk
nh
 
1  (h)

1  lzk

(1 )

~+1 
~k


Bk
(lzk)
 
+
0B@ NX
j=1

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1 
1CA
< 0:
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Notice that the larger h; the stronger is this e¤ect. This is because h is a measure of the size of
the sector. An increase in the degree of substitutability among varieties of the same sector, increases the
demand for labour in that sector. The larger this sector is, the stronger is the increase in the demand, and
consequently the stronger is the reallocation e¤ect towards this sector.
To show that @l
z
k
@nh
< 0 we totally di¤erentiate condition (21) considering that h is a function of nh
(Remember that @h@nh > 0): Rearranging terms I get,
@lzk
@nk
=
 
"
h
kk


Bk
(lzk)
1  @h
@nh
+( 11  )

hh
Bh
kkBk
 1
1   nk
nh
 
1  lzk
h
@h
@nh
1
h
  1nh
i#
(1 )

~+1 
~k


Bk
(lzk)
 
+
0B@ NX
j=1

~j
~k
Bj
Bk
 1
1  nk
nj
 
1 
1CA
< 0:
Notice that the latter is negative if
h
@h
@nh
1
h
   1nh
i
> 0:
This will happen if @h@nh > 
h
nh
: Notice that @h@nh =
(1 h)
(nh)
2 : Substituting this in the previous condition I
get
(1  h) >  (nh   (1  h))
and this implies that:
nh <
(1  h) (1 + )

:
So @l
z
k
@nh
< 0 if nh <
(1 h)(1+)
 : Given that the data report a very low value for  this condition will hold
throughout the paper.
7.3 Proof that 0j  j
From (28) and the denition of  in the autarkic economy, the following expression is obtained.
4 = ((1+M)nj 1+j)[(1 M+2M(1+j))(1 j)+M
2
j (1 j nj)]
nj(1 j)(1+M(1+j))2  
nj 1+j
nj
where 4 = 0j  j
Rearranging terms:
4 = (1 j)(1+M(1+j))[M((1+j)(1 j) jnj)]+[Mj((1 j)+j(1 j nj))]((1+M)nj 1+j)nj(1 j)(1+M(1+j))2
and manipulating the previous expression I get:
4 = M((1+j)(1 j) jnj)[(1 j)(1 j+M(1+j))+j((1+M)nj ]nj(1 j)(1+M(1+j))2
Notice that the second element of the numerator is positive if exports are positive. The third term is
always positive so I can conclude that this expression is always positive, provided that exports are positive.
It would be zero i¤:  j = j ; M = 0: If  j = 0; This expresssion reduces to 
0
j   j = M(1 j)nj(1+M) : Notice that
this expression is increasing in M which implies that the larger the number of trade partners the greater the
increase in competition but it is concave in M revealing that the increase in the number of trade partners
has diminishing e¤ects on competition. This expression is decreasing in nj and the elasticity of substitution
j reecting that the larger the competition levels in autarky, the lower the increase in competition coming
from trade openness, and therefore the lower is the sector productivity growth rate.
7.4 Free Entry
Notice that a rms prots can be expressed as:
ijt =
1
j
(zijt)
 1
qijt   lxijt   lzijt   fj
Rearranging terms, applying symmetry and the zero prot condition I obtain:
1  j
j

lxj = l
z
j + fj :
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Substituting the last equation together with (39) and (40) in condition (30), I get:
Z
0@ NX
j=1
nj
j
lxj +

1  


nkl
x
k
~k
1A = L
Substituting equation (20) in the previous one and rearranging terms:
nkl
x
k
kk
= L
Then:
lxk = kklk
From (36):
lzk =



Bkl
x
k
 1
1 
Substituting the last two equations in the prot function it gives:
 (1  k)klk  



Bkkklk
 1
1 
= fk;8 k
7.5 The degree of Trade Openness
In the article I have explained that the main results regarding the e¤ect of the initial degree of competition
on the impact of trade on innovation hold when I consider a movement from positive to zero trade costs,
keeping constant the degree of trade openness across sectors. This subsection aims to be precise on the way
I have derived that result.
Let us denote j =
(1+j)(1 j) jnj
1 j+Mnjj : A standard measure of the degree of trade openness in a certain
sector is given by (Exports+Imports/GDP). Since trade balance is assumed our trade openness index of
sector j is given by: TOj =
2njpjq

j
njpj(qj+qj )
=
2j
1+j
: Notice that @TOj@nj =
@TOj
@j
@j
@nj
< 0 since @TOj@j > 0 and
@j
@nj
< 0:
The model main equations remained unchanged, once I am able to express the value of j in terms of j :
Consider without loss of generalisation that M = 1:We can rewrite (22) and (23) as:
pj

1  (1  j)
nj(1 + j)

= z 1j (47)
pj

1  (1  j)j
nj(1 + j)

= z 1j (1 +  j) (48)
and dividing (47) and (48) I have that:
nj(1 + j)  (1  j)
nj(1 + j)  (1  j)j =
1
1 +  j
Rearranging (47) and using (9) I obtain
qj =
nj(1 + j)  (1  j)
nj(1 + j)2
zj ljEj (49)
and substituting (47), (48) and (49) in the denition of 0j
0j =
nj(1 + j)
2   (1  j) (1 + 2j )
nj(1 + j)2
Once you have 0j you can solve for all the relevant variables of the model. The case in Free Trade is analogous
using as 0j the expression above.
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8 Appendix 2 Notes on Calibration and Model Fit.
The calibration exercise provides us with a number of rms per product and consequently a measure of
the product market competition in the sector. While the lack of information regarding fj could make the
calibration exercise a little bit rough it is useful to see how the calibrated model ts the data. I have obtained
measures of the average mark-ups for each 3-digit NAICS manufacturing sector using the NBER productivity
Database by Bartelsman et al. (2000). This database contains information about the value of shipments,
production costs and TFP measures for the US manufacturing sectors at a 6-digit level of disaggregation. To
compute the mark-ups I have used the standard measure in the literature: =vship prodc:prodc: :
26 To aggregate
across sectors I have taken a weighted average for each year where I use the share of the value of shipments
as weights. To compare the model with the data I have used an average over the whole sample period
(1958-2009).
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
Figure 6 shows how the model ts the data. Panel A plots the actual versus estimated measure of product
market competition. On average mark-ups are relatively well predicted by the model (the average mark-up
predicted by the model was 18.75% while the average mark-up obtained in our sample was 18.96%). The
standard deviation however reveals that in our model there is substantially less variation as compared to
the real value (0.0151 vs 0.1055). The data suggests that the model does a relatively good job in matching
the average but it only performs satisfactorily in terms of the variability. Although di¤erences in trade costs
and technological R&D di¤erences are capturing important channels through which mark-ups vary across
sectors, the fact that the xed operational costs do not vary in our sample could be the main reason behind
the small variability in mark-ups observed in the predicted data. Panel B shows how the model ts the share
of the labour force engaged in R&D activities. In this case the model performs extraordinarily well both in
average and in the variability.
9 Appendix 3 Asymmetric Trade Liberalisation
In this appendix I report the asymmetric trade liberalisation exercise. The aim of this exercise is to explore
the consequences for innovation of the existence of asymmetries in trade barriers across sectors. As in the
main paper, I distinguish two di¤erent scenarios, restricted entry and free entry.
9.1 Asymmetric Trade Liberalisation. Restricted Entry.
Consider an initial situation in which both sectors are exactly identical and start with the same value for
the trade costs (i.e.  = 0:08). However, a trade policy is implemented in sector 1 but is not implemented
in sector 2. What would be the e¤ects for innovation of this policy?
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
Figure 7 shows the variation in percentage points in the rms R&D-employment in both the liberalised
sector (Sector 1) and the non-liberalised sector (Sector 2). R&D employment increases in the liberalised
sector and decreases in the non-liberalised sector. The largest increase in R&D employment is obtained
when there are no trade costs in sector 1, and this increase varies from 0.3 (with two rms in each sector)
to almost 1% (with six rms). Larger trade cost reductions are associated with larger increases in R&D
employment, although the function is concave. Trade liberalisation enhances productivity growth in those
sectors which liberalise, but it has a non-linear e¤ect. The e¤ect is stronger when those sectors are relatively
more closed to foreign trade. As we have discussed above, this is the consequence of the fact that the
competition e¤ect is stronger the more closed the sector is to foreign trade.
26where vship is the value of shipments and prodc are the production costs. In the production costs I have used labour
costs (to which I have added an estimated cost of social security expenditure paid by the employer), materials (which include
intermediate inputs and energy) and capital costs. For computing the capital costs I have used the capital stocks provided in
the data. For the user cost of capital, I have considered the standard measure rt + ; where rt is the long-term real interest
rate and  is the depreciation cost. For the latter I have distinguished between equipment (with a depreciation rate of 10%)
and plant (with a depreciation rate of 5%). To compute the capital expenditures I have used the lagged value of the capital
stock as suggested in Epifani and Gancia (2011).
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9.2 Asymmetric Trade Liberalisation. Free Entry.
To make our results comparable to the previous subsection I compare a calibrated US economy with no
technological di¤erences in R&D but di¤erences in trade barriers across sectors with a hypothetical identical
economy that faces a common trade barrier across sectors. The latter is equal to the average trade barrier of
the US manufacturing industries obtained from the data. With this counterfactual exercise I am measuring
indirectly the consequences of asymmetric trade liberalisation by comparing a US economy in which there
are only di¤erences in trade barriers across manufacturing sectors with what the same economy would look
like if trade costs were common across all manufacturing sectors.
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE
Figure 8 shows how the degree of competition across sectors di¤ers in both economies. The OX axis in
both graphs measures the change in trade barriers with respect to the average. In panel A we observe the
change in the domestic number of rms between both scenarios. In those industries where trade costs are
above the average (bigger than zero in the OX axis), the number of rms is larger while the reverse happens
in those sectors where trade costs are below the average (smaller than zero in the OX axis). This implies that
in a hypothetical movement to a common trade cost, the number of rms would decline (increase) in those
sectors whose trade costs are above (below) the average. However, markups would fall (increase) in those
sectors whose trade costs are above (below) the average, as Panel B shows. This suggests that trade would
intensify competition in those sectors that are a¤ected by a decline in trade costs and tougher competition
will simultaneously reduce the number of local rms in each sector and the markups. The e¤ect is more
intense the larger the trade cost change.
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE
Figure 9 reveals that labour in production and R&D activities changes substantially across sectors. Panel
A reveals that employment in these activities increases in those sectors that are a¤ected by a decline in trade
costs and the opposite happens in those sectors for which trade costs increase. The e¤ect is also stronger
the larger the change in trade costs.
The previous exercise also suggests that moving towards a unique trade cost increases aggregate produc-
tivity growth, although the impact is small.27 In a scenario in which trade barriers vary across sectors, very
protected sectors (with high trade barriers) invest too little in R&D and labour is relatively more productive
in those sectors while sectors very exposed to foreign trade invest a lot in R&D and so labour is relatively
unproductive in those sectors. A movement towards a common trade cost reallocates labour in R&D gener-
ating an increase in aggregate productivity growth. This suggests that asymmetries across sectors in trade
barriers reduce the potential gains from trade. If these trade barriers are the result of policy outcomes,
governments should try to minimize the di¤erences among them to fully exploit the benets from trade.
10 Appendix 4 Trade Liberalisation with di¤erences in competi-
tion. Common trade costs. Free Entry
In this exercise I compare an economy with a common trade barrier (7.85%) but with di¤erences in competi-
tion, these di¤erences arising as a result of technological di¤erences in R&D, with an identical one in which
there are no trade costs. Since initial trade costs are identical across sectors but sectors di¤er in the degree
of product market competition, this exercise is the equivalent to the rst exercise with common trade costs
but di¤erences in competition exposed in section 3.2.
INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE
27Since the expenditure shares on the di¤erent goods are constant we can approximate aggregate productivity growth by
_z
z
= 
NX
j=1
j
_zj
zj
: A movement to a common trade cost increases aggregate productivity growth by 0.004 percentage points. This
tiny e¤ect is due to the fact that the data suggests very low levels for : On average labor in R&D activities increases as a
consequence of a common tari¤ policy by 0.40%.
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In panel A of gure 10 I show how the number of rms changes. There is a reduction in the number of
rms that is stronger in the initially more competitive sectors, or those relatively less open to foreign trade.
Panel B shows that the decline in markups would be also stronger in those sectors which are initially more
competitive, consistent with the conclusions obtained in section 3.2.
INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE
The movement towards free trade brings a substantial reallocation of employment towards production
and innovation. This increase is more pronounced in the most competitive sectors. In addition, these sectors
experience a larger increase in employment (Panel A in Figure 11).28Again, the reallocation is stronger in
innovation activities (Panel B). Interestingly, the e¤ect on the rms TFP growth, though small is asymmetric
across sectors favoring, however, those sectors which are initially less competitive (Panel C). The reason
behind this result is the fact that the initially less competitive sectors are also the ones in which rms are
more productive in R&D activities.
The previous reallocation e¤ects across sectors also have an impact on sector productivity growth. Al-
though the trade policy has brought productivity growth to all sectors, the increases are small but vary
substantially across sectors (ranging from 0.0012 percentage points to 0.0067 percentage points). Aggregate
productivity growth increases by 0.0038 points.
11 Figures
28That is the case of The Wood Product Manufacturing Industry whose labor force increases by 3.29%.
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Figure 1: A movement from autarky to free trade with di¤erences in the degree of competition across sectors
(Restricted Entry). The number of rms in sector 1 is xed at 2. OX axis in both graphs indicates the
number of rms in sector 2. OY axis in each gure indicates the variation in per rm R&D labour in
percentage points for sector 1 and sector 2 respectively.
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Figure 2: Trade Liberalisation Policy under di¤erences in the degree of product market competition across
sectors (Restricted Entry).
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Figure 3: Symmetric Trade Liberalisation under di¤erences in competition. Sectors start with the same
degree of trade openness which corresponds to the degree of trade openness with an average trade cost of
8% (Degree of Trade Openness: 95% ) and the number of rms equal to two (n=2). We can observe that
the results are analogous in qualitative terms to the exercise from autarky to free trade. Trade liberalisation
pushes innovation more in less competitive sectors.
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Panel B: Changes in Competition
Figure 4: The e¤ects of a movement from a common trade cost to free trade on competition. Changes are
in percentage points.
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Figure 5: The e¤ects of a movement from a common degree of trade openness to free trade. Changes in TFP
growth and the sector labour force are in percentage points. Changes in the labour force are percentage
changes.
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Figure 6: Data Fit. Panel A refers to Mark-ups (Average: 18.96% ) vs. Predicted Average (18.75%).
Correlation Coe¢ cient: 0.1209. Panel B refers for each sector to the share of the labor force engaged in
R&D activities (Data Average. 4.84% vs Predicted Average 3.63%). Correlation Coe¢ cient 0.9985
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Figure 7: Asymmetric trade liberalisation (Restricted Entry). OY axis represents the variation in R&D
employment for the respective sector (sectors 1 and 2) (increments in percentage points) for di¤erent values
of trade costs in sector 1. (OX axis) keeping constant the trade cost in sector 2 (0.08). Sectors are otherwise
identical, however the di¤erent lines represent di¤erent initial degrees of competition. The more outwards
the line is the more competitive the sectors are.
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Figure 8: The impact of a movement towards a common trade cost on competition. Changes in trade barriers
are measured in percentage points. Changes in the number of rms or in the mark-ups are expressed in
percentage changes.
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Figure 9: The impact of a movement to a common trade cost on rm and industry characteristics. Changes
in trade barriers and in TFP growth are in percentage points. Changes in the employment are per rm and
they are expressed as percentage changes.
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Figure 10: The e¤ects of a movement from a common trade cost to free trade on competition. Changes are
in percentage points.
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Figure 11: The e¤ects of a movement from a common trade cost to free trade. Changes in TFP growth and
the sector labour force are in percentage points. Changes in the labour force are percentage changes.
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